Using a random sample of 140 of China's listed firms, we show an adverse impact of related party (RP) sales of goods and services on the usefulness of accounting earnings to investors and on the quality of earnings forecasts by financial analysts. Consistent with the contention that RP sales may violate the arm's-length assumption of regular transactions and consequently impair the representational faithfulness and verifiability of accounting data, we find that earnings of firms engaged in RP sales are at least 33% less informative after controlling for factors known to affect earnings informativeness. We also find that financial analysts are overly credulous in their acceptance of earnings numbers that are contaminated by unreliable RP sales, and provide less accurate and more optimistic earnings forecasts for firms with more RP sales. Overall, our results provide strong empirical evidence on the negative impact of RP transactions on the usefulness of accounting earnings data used by investors and by financial analysts.
There are various types of RP transactions. On a set of RP transactions for 366 American public firms that they hand-collected during the years 2000-2001, Gordon and Henry (2003) identify several major types of RP transactions, such as direct transactions with employees or with board members, contract services or legal services acquired from management, sales to (purchases from) related parties and loans to (from) related parties. Their statistics show that 47% of their sample firms provided loans to RPs, 20.2% engaged in direct service relations involving an executive and another related party, while 19.2% made purchases from RPs, and 2 11.3% made sales to related parties. In contrast, Aharony et al. (2010) show that around 60% of Chinese initial public offerings during the period 1999-2001 engaged in sales of goods and services to their controlling parent companies, in a mean dollar amount of US$ 23.57 million, compared with a mean of US$3.66 million for Gordon and Henry's (2003) American sample.
Our study focuses on the impact of RP sales of goods and services on earnings informativeness as perceived by capital market investors, and on the quality of analysts' earnings forecasts, the reason being that RP sales have the most direct impact on earnings number. We choose a Chinese setting for our analysis because China provides both a unique institutional setting and RPT data. Our results provide an assessment of the extent to which RP sales of goods and services contribute to impairing earnings informativeness and the quality of analysts'
forecasts.
We randomly select 140 firms out of 383 firms that were listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1997. We then hand-collect all RP sales of goods and services data for the 140 companies, from their annual reports during the period of 1998 to 2004. Statistical analysis of the data collected for our sample firms indicate that they are not significantly different in their characteristics from the entire population of 383 firms. Both our two-way fixed effect panel data analysis and our pooled ordinary least square regressions suggest that RP sales significantly reduce earnings informativeness in China. The results are robust after controlling for factors that may affect earnings informativeness such as firm size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage. In addition, we find that Chinese financial analysts do not account for the adverse impact of RP sales on earnings. In particular, their forecasts are considerably less accurate for firms with more RP sales of goods and services, and the forecasts they provide become ever more excessively optimistic the more firms engage in RP sales. These results suggest that financial analysts are 3 unduly willing to trust earnings numbers that are contaminated by unreliable RP sales, consistent with the evidence in Teoh and Wong (2002) on the credulity of financial analysts. In summary, our results suggest that RP sales significantly reduce both earnings informativeness to investors and the quality of analysts' earnings forecasts in China.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we provide the institutional background on China's disclosure of RP transactions. Section III discusses prior research and develops our hypotheses. We present the research design, data and empirical results of the impact of RP sales on earnings informativeness and on the quality of analysts' forecasts in sections IV and V, respectively. Section VI provides a conclusion.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In 1997, the Chinese Ministry of Finance, which serves as the accounting standards setter in China, promulgated an accounting standard for RP transactions (hereafter, the RPT Standard), which requires publicly listed companies to disclose all material RPTs in the form of notes to the financial statements. The RPT Standard defines RPTs to include transactions occurring between a listed firm and its parent company or with another affiliated firm. However, the related parties need not necessarily be other listed companies. They may also be a listed firm and its management, board members, principal owners, or members of the immediate families of any of these groups. Nevertheless, as Chinese firms are largely owned by corporate shareholders, almost all RP transactions are executed between listed firms and their respective affiliated firms such as parent companies or other subsidiaries of these parent companies (Aharony et al. 2010) .
The RPT Standard has relatively detailed disclosure requirements, similar to those set forth by SFAS 57 in the USA (Gordon, Henry and Palia 2004) . The disclosure must include information on the nature of the relationship between the parties involved, the core operations of each related party, a description of the nature of each type of transaction, and information on the amounts involved. The RPT Standard also lists the various types of RPTs that publicly listed firms must disclose in the form of notes to the financial statements: sales and purchases of goods and services, commission relationships, overhead reimbursements, transfer of R&D, permits and franchises, trade of assets other than goods, including exchange of fixed assets, capital and operating leases and borrowing or lending, including interest payments.
PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
Concerns that RP transactions could adversely impact the reliability of financial information both in terms of representational faithfulness and reliability of reported amounts date back to 1982, when the FASB issued the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 57.
As pointed out in SFAS 57, "transactions involving related parties cannot be presumed to be carried out on an arm's-length basis, as the requisite conditions of competitive, free-market dealings may not exist." It further elaborates that "relationships between parties may enable one of the parties to exercise a degree of influence over the other such that the influenced party may be favored or caused to subordinate it independent interests" (para. 13, FASB 1982) . Such concerns did not draw much attention until the outburst of the recent accounting scandals of Enron, Adelphia and others. Enron used special purpose entities controlled by its CEO to manipulate income and Adelphia guaranteed related party debt and provided extensive loans to executives. In both cases, the result was irrelevant and unreliable accounting information.
Nevertheless, there is limited empirical evidence on the impact of RP transactions on the quality of key accounting information such as earnings. To the best of our knowledge, Gordon and 5 Henry (2003) is the first and only study to use US data to show the impact of RP transactions on earnings quality. They show that absolute abnormal accruals are positively associated with RP transactions, suggesting that this is due to the incentive of managers to manipulate earnings to mask their expropriation from RP transactions. As abnormal accruals are well accepted as a measure of earnings quality (see, e.g., Dechow and Schrand 2004) , Gordon and Henry's results imply that RP transactions may reduce earnings quality.
The adverse impact of RP transactions on earnings quality is also documented in a China setting. Jian and Wong (2010) show that Chinese listed companies with group structure are more likely to engage in RP sales with their parent companies to manipulate earnings. Aharony et al.
(2010) present evidence of earnings management through RP sales during the IPO process in China. They also show that abnormal RP sales are positively associated with abnormal accruals.
Overall, these studies provide empirical evidence of earnings management via or induced by RP transactions.
The adverse impact of RP transactions on earnings quality implies an adverse impact on the usefulness of earnings to investors insofar as earnings usefulness is highly dependent on earnings quality (Dechow and Schrand 2004 Prior studies suggest that financial analysts are credulous in the sense that they cannot identify earnings quality erosion due to factors such as opportunistic earnings management. For example, Teoh and Wong (2002) show that financial analysts systematically underestimate the 6 extent of earnings management, and therefore are overly ready to believe that high accruals reflect good news. As already noted, Aharony et al. (2010) show that Chinese companies engage in RP sales of goods and services to manipulate their earnings and that there is a significant positive association between RP sales and absolute abnormal accruals. Consequently, we expect to find that Chinese financial analysts are also more credulous about firms that engage in higher level of RP sales of goods and services, and that the result will be a higher forecast error and more optimistic earnings forecasts. Formally stated, our second hypothesis (in alternative form)
is:
H 2 : Financial analysts' earnings forecasts are less accurate and more optimistic for firms that engage in a higher level of RP sales of goods and services.
THE IMPACT OF RP SALES ON EARNINGS INFORMATIVENESS

Research design
To test whether earnings informativeness is decreasing with the level of RP sales of goods and services (H 1 ), we investigate whether differential earnings informativeness exists between firms with RP sales and firms without RP sales. Following Easton and Harris (1991) , Francis et al. (2005) and others, we assess informativeness by the magnitude of the earnings response coefficient (ERC), i.e., the slope coefficients obtained from regressions of annual returns on both the level of and change in annual earnings. We include interactions between earnings (and changes in earnings) and the level of RP sales and interpret the respective estimated coefficients as evidence of differences in earnings informativeness or lack of such evidence. We also include in these regressions four control variables that have been shown in 7 prior research to affect earnings informativeness (losses, firm size, market to book ratio and financial leverage). Accordingly, we run the following two regression models:
where:
RET j,t = firm j's 12-month cumulative raw stock return over the period beginning in the fifth month following the end of fiscal year t-1 to the fourth month after fiscal year t; EARN j,t = firm j's net income in year t, scaled by the market value of equity as of year-end t-
1;
ΔEARN j,t = change in net income between year t and t-1, scaled by the market value of equity as of year-end t-1; RPS j,t = firm j's sales of goods and services to its related parties for year t, scaled by total net sales for year t; k t j CON , = a vector of control variables, k = 1, 2, 3, and 4:
, and 0 otherwise; 2 ,t j CON = SIZE j,t = the natural log of firm j's total assets as of year-end t; 3 ,t j CON = MBE j,t = the ratio of firm j's market value of equity to book value of equity as of year-end t; 8 4 ,t j CON = DEBT j,t = firm j's leverage, measured as the ratio of firm j's long-term debt to total book value of assets as of year-end t.
We include the four control variables in our regression analyses because prior studies have shown that each is associated with the magnitude of the ERC, our measure of earnings informativeness. Hayn (1995) documents that the ERC is smaller for loss observations than for profit observations; Chaney and Jeter (1992) find the ERC is increasing in firm size while Freeman (1987) reports that it is negatively related to firm size; Collins and Kothari (1989) show that the market-to-book ratio, a common measure of the firm's growth, is positively associated with earnings informativeness; finally, Dhaliwal et al. (1991) report that the ERC is negatively associated with financial leverage.
To test hypothesis H 1 we examine the magnitude of the estimated coefficient for the interaction between earnings and the level of RP sales ( 2  ) in model (1a). Similarly, for model (1b) we examine the magnitude of ( 2  + 4  ), the sum of the estimated coefficients for the interactions of level of RP sales with earnings and change in earnings, respectively. An adverse impact of RP sales on earnings informativeness implies 2  < 0 for the first model and ( 2  + 4  ) < 0 for the second model.
Sample selection and data
Our sample consists of 140 companies that were randomly selected without replacement from the entire population of 383 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1997. As
shown below, our sample firms' characteristics well represent those of the entire population. For each firm, we manually collected all data on RP sales of goods and services from the annual reports for the seven-year period 1998 to 2004, a total of 980 firm-year observations. Other accounting and financial information was obtained from the China Stock Market & Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database, the leading supplier of both financial accounting data and stock prices for all listed companies in China. Table 1 presents the sample composition classified by nine major industries (two-digit SIC code). The industry classification was first obtained from the China Securities Regulatory
Committee. We then reclassified the industries into nine categories based on Campbell (1996) .
As there are only a small number of firms in the petroleum industries (SIC code 13, 29), we combine them with the basic industries. The sample excludes the utility industries (SIC code 46, 48, 49) and the financial services industries (SIC code 60-69). As Table 1 shows, the total sample is about 37% of the entire population. Per industry, we randomly selected from 25% to 35% of the respective population except for the services industry (76%) and the transportation industry (53%). The last two columns of Table 1 [Insert Table 1 Here] Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables in models (1a) and (1b). We winsorize the observations of each continuous independent variable by half a percent in each tail.
As depicted in the table, on the average, the 140 sample firms earned an 11.78% annual return during the sample period 1998 to 2004, compared with a 9.35% annual return for the 243 non-sample firms in the same period. The mean of earnings scaled by market value is about 1.68%
while the mean of change in earnings scaled by market value is close to 0% (compared with 1.95% and 0%, respectively, for the non-sample firms). Notably, on the average, RP sales of goods and services account for 11.56% of total net sales and more than half (51.47%) of the sample firms have RP sales with their parent companies. As for the control variables, 8.63
percent of the sample firms report losses during the sample period; on the average, size measured by total assets' book value is 2,003 million RMB (total equity market value is 3,110 million RMB), market-to-book ratio is 3.90 and financial leverage ratio is 7.75%. In comparison, of the remaining 243 non-sample firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the same period, 9.58 percent report losses, and on the average, their size, measured by total assets, is 2,319 million RMB (total equity market value is 3,310 million RMB), their market-to-book ratio is
4.33, and their financial leverage ratio is 7.15%. Either a t-test between mean values or a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test between medians (not tabulated) indicates that there is no significant difference between our randomly selected sample and the remaining non-selected firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange for any of the summary statistics reported above.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Empirical results
We use pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to estimate models (1a) and (1b).
To control for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems, we also employ twoway fixed effects panel data regressions. indicates the absence of multicollinearity problems. The results of these tests indicate that none of the independent variables has a VIF value that exceeds 2. We conclude, therefore, that no serious multicollinearity problem is present in the regression analysis.
The regression results reported in Table 3 
THE IMPACT OF RP SALES ON THE QUALITY OF ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECASTS
Research design
To test whether financial analysts' earnings forecasts are less accurate and more optimistic for firms that engage in a higher level of RP sales of goods and services (H 2 ), we first estimate two important properties of earnings forecasts: forecast accuracy and forecast bias.
Following the tradition in the literature (e.g., Duru and Reeb 2002), we measure financial analysts' earnings forecast accuracy, for each firm-year observation, by the absolute value of the difference between the consensus analysts' earnings per share forecast and the actual earnings per share, scaled by the stock price at the latest forecast date:
where ACCU t = the negative of the consensus absolute forecast error for year t;
= the consensus analysts' earnings per share forecast for year t made prior to actual earnings announcement for year t;
EPS t = the actual earnings per share for year t;
PRICE t-1 = the stock price per share at the latest forecast date.
Multiplying this absolute forecast error by (-1) gives a measure that increases with greater forecast accuracy. Thus, when a firm attribute is positively associated with ACCU, such an attribute contributes to a more accurate analyst forecast.
We measure financial analysts' earnings forecast bias (BIAS), for each firm-year observation, as the signed forecast error, defined as the difference between the consensus analysts' earnings per share forecast and the actual earnings per share, scaled by the stock price at the latest forecast date:
Forecast optimism increases as BIAS becomes larger. Thus, when a firm attribute is positively associated with BIAS, such an attribute contributes to a more optimistic analyst forecast.
We next examine the association between RP sales of goods and services and each of the two forecast properties, ACCU and BIAS, by regressing each measure separately on the level of IndustryDummies = eight dummies for the nine industries outlined in Table 1 . Duru and Reeb (2002) find that firm size (SIZE) likely indicates more complexity and thus greater forecast error, but, at the same time, the availability of more pre-disclosure information by larger firms may lead to lower forecast error. Hwang et al. (1996) et al. (1998) suggest less optimistic forecasts for more heavily followed firms. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that forecast dispersion (DISP) is negatively related to analysts' forecast accuracy. Finally, to control for the potential impact of changes in macro economic conditions and industry complexity, throughout the sample period, on analysts' forecasting behavior, we add time-dummies and industry-dummies to regression model (4).
Earnings per share forecast data
Chinese earnings forecast data were obtained from Investoday Ltd., a leading financial Panel B of the Appendix shows the correlation coefficients among the variables participating in the analysts' forecasts analysis. As expected, RP sales of goods and services as a percentage of total net sales are associated with less accurate and more optimistic forecasts, consistent with hypothesis H 2 . We also find that analysts issue less accurate and more optimistic forecasts in loss firm-years, as does Brown (2001) . Similarly to the approach taken in section IV, we calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all OLS regression variables to alleviate concerns about multicollinearity problems among the independent variables. The results of these tests indicate that none of the independent variables has a VIF value that exceeds 3. We conclude, therefore, that no serious multicollinearity problem is present in the regression analysis. behavior (e.g., Richardson et al. 2004) , the mean and median signed forecast errors (BIAS) are positive, indicating that Chinese analysts are, on the average, optimistic. Variables that are positively related to BIAS are associated with more optimistic forecasts. As mean and median consensus forecast data give similar results, we report only the results based on the mean forecasts. Notably, compared with the full sample used in section IV, the reduced sample firms have a lower average ratio of RP sales of goods and services over total net sales (7.49% versus 11.56%) but a higher median ratio (0.46% versus 0.03%). In addition, 13.3% of the reduced sample firms report losses, compared with 8.63% of the full sample. Firm size measured by total assets indicates that the reduced sample is, on the average, larger, probably because its statistics is based on more recent years. As for the remaining analyst forecasts' control variables, on the average, analysts make their last forecasts about one month (0.967) prior to the actual earnings announcement date; there are five analysts following each sample firm; and forecast dispersion is about 0.5% of stock prices at the forecast date.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Empirical results
We use pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to estimate model (4). The regression results reported in Table 5 [Insert Table 5 here]
The last column of Table 5 reports the results of model (4) suggesting that each of these four control variables is associated with more optimistic earnings forecasts. Only the coefficient estimates for firm size (SIZE) and analyst following (FOL) are insignificantly different from zero. These results are also consistent with our earnings prediction accuracy model.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Anecdotal evidence suggests that RP transactions impair the representational faithfulness and verifiability of accounting data. Thus, for example, the misreporting of profitability via RP transactions by a former CFO of Enron only became apparent as the firm began to collapse. In this paper we explore whether RP sales of goods and services reduce earnings informativeness to 20 capital market investors and consequently affect the quality of earnings forecasts by financial analysts. We focus on RP sales of goods and services because they affect accounting earnings more directly than other types of RP transactions such as directors' loans.
Using a random sample of 140 firms from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we find a significant negative association between the level of RP sales of goods and services and earnings informativeness measured by the earnings response coefficient (ERC), after controlling for other factors known to affect the ERC. Earnings of firms engaged in RP sales are at least 33% less informative than those of other firms. The results are consistent with the contention that RP sales violate the arm's-length assumption for regular transactions and hence reduce the quality of accounting earnings. We also find that financial analysts credulously accept misleading RP sales data and provide less accurate and more optimistic earnings forecasts for firms with more RP sales of goods and services. Overall, our results show that RP sales of goods and services reduce the usefulness of accounting earnings to capital market investors and make it more difficult for financial analysts to provide accurate earnings forecasts.
The paper has, at least, two implications. The results have policy implications for China and other markets with pervasive related party transactions. As outlined in Aharony et al. (2010) , the Chinese government has been taking actions to minimize the negative impact of related party sales between listed companies and their parent companies. For example, since 2006, the Chinese government has been encouraging unlisted parent companies to take the entire entity public, in order to create a standard-alone listed company rather than a parent-subsidiary group which involves pervasive related party sales. Our results also suggest that financial analysts should not be unduly willing to trust earnings numbers that are contaminated by unreliable related party sales. However, the limitation is that financial analysts cannot observe the quality of 21 related party sales directly from companies' financial disclosures. Thus they should acquire more private information about related party sales. Panel A reports the correlation matrix for the variables in the regression models (1a) and (1b). The upper (lower) diagonal reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients. p-values are provided in parentheses. ** and *** denote significance at a level of 5% and 1%, respectively.
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APPENDIX: Pearson and Spearman
Variable definitions:
RET j,t = firm j's 12-month cumulative raw stock return over the period beginning 4 months following the end of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after fiscal year t; EARN j,t = firm j's net income in year t, scaled by the market value of equity as of year-end t-1; ΔEARN j,t = change in net income between year t and t-1, scaled by the market value of equity as of year-end t-1; RPS j,t = firm j's sales of goods and services to its related parties for year t, scaled by total net sales for year t; LOSS j,t = a dummy variable, equal to one when firm j's net income for year t is negative, and zero otherwise; SIZE j,t = the natural log of firm j's total assets as of year-end t; MBE j,t = the ratio of firm j's market value of equity to book value of equity as of year-end t; DEBT j,t = firm j's leverage, measured as the ratio of firm j's long-term debt to total book value of assets as of year-end t. Variable definitions: ACCU j,t = firm j's earnings forecast accuracy in year t as defined by Eq (2); BIAS j,t = firm j's earnings forecast bias in year t as defined by Eq (3); RPS j,t = firm j's sales of goods and services to its related parties, scaled by total net sales in year t; SIZE j,t = the natural log of firm j's total assets as of year-end t; LOSS j,t = a dummy variable, equal to one when firm j's net income for year t is negative, and zero otherwise; ΔEARN j,t = change in net income between year t and t-1, scaled by the market value of equity as of year-end t-1; HORZ j,t = firm j's forecast horizon in year t, expressed as the number of months between the forecast month and the end of fiscal year t; FOL j,t = number of financial analysts following firm j in year t; DISP j,t = financial analysts' forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of firm j's analysts' forecasts in year t deflated by the stock price per share at the forecast date. a The number of listed firms in the entire population per industry is in parentheses.
The table shows the sample composition of 140 firms randomly selected from the entire population of 383 firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1997, classified by nine major industries (two-digit SIC code). The industry classification is based on Campbell (1996) . As the number of firms in the petroleum industries (SIC code 13, 29) is small, we combine them with the basic industries. The sample excludes the utility industries (SIC code 46, 48, 49) and the financial services industries (SIC 60-69). Variable definitions: 12-month stock return (RET) is firm j's stock return for year t, beginning four months following the end of year t-1 and ending four months after the end of year t; Earnings as % of market value (EARN) is firm j's net income (before extraordinary items) in year t scaled by its market value of equity as of year-end t -1; ΔEarnings as % of market value (ΔEARN) is firm j's net income in year t minus net income in year t -1, scaled by its market value of equity as of year-end t -1; RP sales as % of total net sales (RPS) is firm j's sales of goods and services to its related parties in year t, scaled by its total net sales in year t; % RP sales >0 is the percentage of firms with RP sales greater than zero in year t; Total RP sales is firm j's total sales of goods and services to its related parties in year t; Total net sales is firm j's total sales revenue net of sales allowance, sales discount, and sales returns in year t; % Earnings < 0 (LOSS) is the percentage of firms with reported negative net income in year t; Total assets is firm j's total book value of assets as of year-end t; Market-to-book ratio (MBE) is the ratio of firm j's market value of equity to book value of equity as of year-end t; Long-term debt as % total assets (DEBT) is the ratio of firm j's long-term debt to total book value of assets as of year-end t; Equity market value is firm j's closing price as of year-end t times total number of outstanding common shares as of year-end t. Variable definitions: mean (median) consensus forecast (FORECAST) is analysts' forecast of annual earnings of Chinese firms; forecast accuracy (ACCU) is firm j's earnings forecast accuracy in year t as defined by Eq (2); forecast bias (BIAS) is firm j's earnings forecast bias in year t as defined by Eq (3); related party sales (RPS) is firm j's sales of goods and services to its related parties, scaled by total net sales in fiscal year t; firm size (SIZE) is the natural log of firm j's total assets as of year-end t; loss firm-years (LOSS) is a dummy variable, equal to one when firm j's net earnings for year t are negative, and zero otherwise; earnings changes (ΔEARN ) is change in EARN j,t between year t-1 and t, scaled by market value of equity as of year-end t-1; forecast horizon (HORZ) is firm j's forecast horizon in year t, expressed as the number of months between the forecast month and the end of year t; number of analysts following (FOL) is the number of financial analysts following firm j in year t; forecast dispersion (DISP) is the analysts' forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of firm j's analysts' forecasts in year t deflated by the stock price per share at the forecast date. 
